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Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period,
they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to
the Nash bargaining solution. In the ￿rst period, either of them is able
to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-
o⁄, and thereby a⁄ects the distribution of the gains from collusion. The
resulting innovation incentive is strictly smaller than in the competitive
case.
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Is competition good for innovation? There is a large literature comparing
monopoly and competition, going back to [Schumpeter 1912] [Arrow 1962]. This
paper adds the comparison between collusion and competition. It introduces a
two-period model. Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the sec-
ond period, they will be able to collude in the product market. However, in the
￿rst period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Collusion
in the ￿rst period is excluded.
The paper shows that collusion does leave room for innovation. The innova-
tion incentive is due to the fact that the distribution of gains from collusion is at
stake. The paper assumes that cartel pro￿ts are shared in accordance with the
Nash bargaining solution, with status quo payo⁄s given by the players payo⁄s in
the noncooperative version of the price setting game. If only one ￿rm innovates,
this changes the status quo payo⁄ to the advantage of the innovator and to the
disadvantage of the competitor. The competitor loses part of the gains from
collusion. Innovation is no longer driven by greed only. The complementary
motive of fear comes into play. Yet in the collusive case, innovation incentives
are weaker than in the competitive case. In the competitive case, the innova-
tor undercuts the previous competitive price. It sells the previous competitive
2quantity +", but produces at the lower cost. This gives the innovator a positive
pro￿t. It is the quantity sold, times the cost reduction ￿".
Moreover, without collusion, in equilibrium only one ￿rm innovates, pro-
vided the cost of innovation is smaller than the pro￿t of the innovator. If both
innovate, both make zero pro￿t, and have to bear the cost of innovation. If the
other ￿rm innovates, it is the best response not to engage in innovation. This
result also holds with collusion if innovation is so costly that it is only pro￿table
for a single innovator. However, if innovation is less costly, in equilibrium both
￿rms innovate. This even holds if, as a result, both of them are worse o⁄ than
before innovation. This is an equilibrium as long as not being the innovator
reduces the pro￿t even more.
It seems that the question has not been investigated thus far. Closest is
[Arrow 1962]. But in his paper, competition is compared to monopoly, not
to collusion. Moreover there is intellectual property, which is assumed away
here. Most of the large literature on innovation has assumed competition in the
product markets [Freeman 1960, for an overview]. This is di⁄erent for the liter-
ature on R&D joint ventures [d￿ Aspremont 1988] [Cellini 2002] [Suetens 2005].
However, these authors are interested in cooperative or collusive invention, not
in collusion in the product markets. There is an extensive literature on dif-
ferentiated oligopoly [Cellini 2003, for an overview]. Most of this literature
is interested in the e⁄ects of innovation on the stability of explicit or im-
plicit cartels [Deneckere 1983] [Wernerfeld 1986] [Rothschild 1992] [Ross 1992]
[Raith 1996] [Rothschild 1997] [Albaek 1998] [Lambertini 1999] [Posada 2000]
[Symeonidis 2002]. Others wanted to know how ￿rms self-select to di⁄erent
points of the quality spectrum [Dutta 1990] [Lambertini 1996], and what the
prospect of future competition means for innovation investment [Lambertini 1998].
Yet others have investigated under which conditions collusion in sequential in-
novation might be socially bene￿cial [Denicol￿ 2002].
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 compares the incentives for process innovation in the competitive and in the
collusive case. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
Two risk-neutral ￿rms play a game in two periods. In the ￿rst period, they
have an opportunity to do research and development regarding the technology
to produce a homogenous good. In the second period, they compete in price. In
the product market, they interact simultaneously. For the demand, switching
from one supplier to another is free of charge. Production is to demand. Demand
is given by p = ￿ ￿ ￿Q, where p is price, Q is quantity, ￿ is the intercept, and
￿ is the slope. Demand takes the prices posted by the suppliers.
The ￿rms are able to collude in the product market. They split gains from
collusion according to the Nash bargaining solution [Nash 1950]. Each ￿rm is
3able to enforce the collusion agreement against the other. Side payments are
possible and enforceable.
Initially both suppliers have identical constant marginal production cost ￿ <
￿. There is no ￿xed cost. In the ￿rst period, they have the costly opportunity to
invest in process innovation. It reduces production cost to ￿￿￿ < ￿. Innovation
cost I is common knowledge. If innovation has been successful, each supplier
may credibly inform its competitor about the resulting reduction in production
cost.
The resulting two period game is solved by backwards induction. The ￿rms
anticipate their payo⁄s in four situations: neither of them invests ￿00, the other
invests ￿01, both invest ￿11, the ￿rm is the only to invest ￿10. Based on these
results, and on I, they decide whether to invest.
3 Innovation Incentives
Innovation incentives in the noncooperative case provide the benchmark. They
result from comparing payo⁄s pre and post innovation. In the collusive case,
the payo⁄ pre innovation is half the gains from collusion. Innovation increases
the gains from collusion, and it gives the innovator a higher status quo payo⁄.
These e⁄ects translate into a higher payo⁄ for the innovator, and a lower payo⁄
for the competitor, compared to the gains from collusion pre innovation. If both
innovate, they split the increased gains from collusion evenly. Consequently, a
￿rm is best o⁄ if it is the only to innovate, over being one of two innovators,
over both not innovating, over being the one that has not innovated, if the other
has innovated. Given this ranking of payo⁄s, innovation incentives are driven
by innovation cost. It turns out that innovation incentives are always stronger
in the competitive case, and that collusion is never e¢ cient.
3.1 The Competitive Benchmark
If there is no collusion in the second period, the ￿rms play the standard Bertrand
game with price p￿ = ￿, and industry quantity Q￿ =
￿￿￿
￿ : This gives each of
them ￿￿
00 = 0. If both innovate, they still expect ￿￿








The incumbent has ￿￿





It is straightforward to see that, in pure strategies, one and only one ￿rm invests
if ￿￿








Otherwise, there is no investment.
43.2 Collusion Without Innovation
If they collude, the two ￿rms set cartel price pC =
￿+￿




















while the status quo payo⁄ of the incumbent remains ￿￿
01 = 0. The new pro￿t
maximising price and quantity are
^ pC =
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
2
^ QC =
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
2￿
If the innovation is radical, i.e. if
^ pC =
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
2
< ￿
there is no longer room for collusion. However, if
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1)
, i.e. if the innovation is non-radical, the competitor is still able to undercut the
pro￿t maximising price. In a cartel, the competitor agrees not to supply the
product, against a side payment. Industry pro￿t then is
^ ￿C =
(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)2
4￿




10)(^ ￿C ￿ x ￿ ￿￿
01)
and gives the innovator
￿10 =




















If both ￿rms innovate, their status quo payo⁄s go down to 0. The Nash
bargaining solution splits ^ ￿C evenly. Each then has
￿11 =
(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿)2
8￿
3.4 Ranking of Payo⁄s
Proposition 1 If the innovation is non radical in the sense of (1), payo⁄s are
ranked ￿10 > ￿11 > ￿00 > ￿01:
To see this, compare them piecewise.
￿10 ￿ ￿11 =
￿(￿ ￿ ￿)
2￿
is positive since ￿ > ￿. ￿11 > ￿00 is straightforward since ￿ > 0. ￿00 > ￿01
requires
￿00 ￿ ￿01 =
￿ (2￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿)
8￿
> 0
If the innovation is non-radical, 2￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0. Hence the inequality
holds.
This is not surprising. At the borderline, i.e. with ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿, the innovator
is indi⁄erent between collusion and going it alone, since the Nash bargaining
scheme gives the competitor a payo⁄ of 0.
￿01 j￿=￿￿￿ =
(￿ + (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)2
8￿
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
2￿
= 0
Were they still to calculate the same way, with ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ + ", the Nash result
for the competitor would grow to
"2
8￿
However this is meaningless since the Nash bargaining solution only makes sense
if there are gains from trade.
63.5 The Innovation Game




Both ￿rms innovate if ￿10￿I > ￿11￿I > ￿00 > ￿01, and if ￿10￿I > ￿00 >
￿11 ￿ I > ￿01. The latter case is possible only because, ignoring investment
cost, ￿00 > ￿01. Note that in this case both ￿rms lose money, compared to the
situation without innovation. In this case, the Bertrand dilemma extends to the
two period game with innovation. Finally, double investment is a possibility if
￿00 > ￿10 ￿I > ￿11 ￿I > ￿01. In the one equilibrium in pure strategies, both
￿rms invest. In the other both do not invest. In the latter, their payo⁄s are
higher. One ￿rm innovates if ￿10￿I > ￿00 > ￿01 > ￿11￿I. No ￿rm innovates
if ￿00 > ￿01 > ￿10 ￿ I > ￿11 ￿ I and if ￿00 > ￿10 ￿ I > ￿01 > ￿11 ￿ I.
The maximum investment cost I depends on the equilibrium. If in equilib-
rium only one ￿rm innovates,
￿10 ￿ I > ￿00 ) IC





(6￿ + ￿ ￿ 6￿)
must hold. If ￿00 > ￿10￿I > ￿11￿I > ￿01, and if ￿10￿I > ￿00 > ￿11￿I >
￿01
￿11 ￿ I > ￿01 ) IC






must hold. Finally, in the ￿rst game,
￿11 ￿ I > ￿00 ) IC





(2￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿)
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(2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2￿)
From (1), ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Evaluating IC
intermediate ￿ IC
min at the borderline yields
1
8￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2. However large ￿, the di⁄erence thus is positive.
73.6 Welfare Assessment




Provided there is investment, welfare is











Welfare is given by
W00 = R00 + ￿C =
3(￿ ￿ ￿)2
8￿
If either or both ￿rms innovate, consumer rent goes up to
R10 = R11 =
(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)2
8￿
If only one ￿rm innovates, welfare is
W10 = R10 + ^ ￿C ￿ I =
3(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)2
8￿
￿ I
If both ￿rms innovate, welfare is reduced to
W11 =
3(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)2
8￿
￿ 2I
Hence it is never e¢ cient that both ￿rms innovate.
Proposition 2 The maximum investment is larger in the competitive than in
the collusive case.
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(2￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿)
Using (1), with the largest possible ￿, this becomes 1
8￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2, which is posi-
tive. The maximum investment is larger in the competitive than in the collusive
case.
Why is that? Collusion brings the innovator under the spell of its competitor.
As long as the innovation is not radical, the innovator must give the competitor
something in recompense for not using its power to undercut the new monopoly
price. Of course, post innovation, Nash bargaining gives the innovator half of
the status quo payo⁄ plus half of the gains from collusion. With collusion, the
innovator thus has a higher payo⁄ than with competition. However, this is
not how the innovator calculates. It compares innovating with not innovating,
but colluding. In the latter case, its payo⁄ would have been half of the gains
from collusion without innovation. As long as the innovation is not radical, the
innovator is unable to fully appropriate this. Graphically, the situation looks as
in Figure 1.
In the competitive case, the innovator has A + B + C. With collusion, but
without innovation, both ￿rms have half the gains from collusion, or D. Post
innovation, the innovator has half its status quo payo⁄, plus half the new gains
from collusion, or C + E. I￿
max > IC
max holds if A + B + C > C + E ￿ D, or if
9A + B > E ￿ D. E ￿ D < A must hold. pC ￿ ^ pC < ￿. Innovation never lowers
the cartel price as much as the innovation. Hence I￿
max ￿ IC
max > B .
Another way of making the point is this: The innovation incentive with com-
petition enters Nash bargaining as the status quo payo⁄ of the innovator. The
Nash scheme gives the innovator half of this, plus half of the gains from collu-
sion. From the latter, the innovator subtracts half of the gains from collusion










10 = ￿￿C > ￿￿
10
would have to hold. However, the cartel sets ^ pC such that ^ pC ￿ pC < ￿.
Moreover, since ^ pC > p￿, the cartel only sells ^ QC < Q￿. Consequently in both
the price and the quantity dimensions
￿￿C =
￿
^ pC ￿ pC￿ ^ QC < ￿￿
10 = ￿Q￿
Using the respective maximum investment for assessing welfare, one has
































5￿2 ￿ 10￿￿ ￿ 2￿2 + 5￿2￿
Using (1), and evaluating at the borderline, this becomes 3(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 ; which is
positive. Consequently, even if only one ￿rm innovates, collusion is ine¢ cient.
The ine¢ ciency grows if, in equilibrium, both ￿rms innovate.
4 Discussion
How robust is the ￿nding that innovation incentives are stronger with compe-
tition? Does the result only hold since marginal cost has been assumed to be
constant? With decreasing marginal cost, the situation is pretty much the same.
If they compete in the product market, and without innovation, both ￿rms make
zero pro￿t. The same holds if both innovate. Hence in the competitive case,
payo⁄s are ranked as with constant marginal cost. In equilibrium, only one
￿rm innovates. With increasing marginal cost, there is a positive producer rent
even without innovation or collusion. Innovation is no longer the only way to
make a pro￿t. This reduces innovation incentives if one compares constant and
increasing marginal cost. However in the comparison between competition and
collusion, given marginal cost increases, the opportunity cost resulting from the
10positive producer rent cancels out. For now both ￿rms have a positive status
quo payo⁄. The Nash solution gives the innovator half of the gains from collu-
sion post innovation + half of its own status quo payo⁄ - half of the status quo
payo⁄ of its competitor. Hence, the Nash result for the innovator is half of the
increase in gains from collusion + half of the innovation incentive in the com-
petitive case. For the same reason as with constant marginal cost, the increase
in gains from collusion is strictly smaller than the innovation incentive in the
competitive case.
5 Conclusion
The paper has two tentative messages, one to the intellectual property commu-
nity, and another to the antitrust community. If ￿rms compete in price, i.e. if
capacity limits do not matter, intellectual property is not the only way how to
incentivize innovation. A complementary incentive results from the desire to
free oneself from control by the competitor. The e⁄ect remains strong if ￿rms
are able to collude in the product market, but it is strictly smaller than in the
competitive case. This ￿nding is particularly relevant in industries where the
cost of inventing around is small, despite the existence of intellectual property
rights [Levin 1987, 809, for empirical evidence].
The antitrust message is clear within the framework of the model presented
in the paper. While collusion does only mildly a⁄ect innovation incentives, it
is not e¢ cient. A particularly harmful e⁄ect of collusion is that it induces dou-
ble innovation whenever the innovation cost is su¢ ciently small.The antitrust
message becomes more ambigous if one assumes a less certain world; innovation
is about navigating uncharted territory, after all. Innovators hardly ever know
exactly how likely they are to succeed. Normally, they do not even know ex
ante what exactly success means. In innovative activities, the problem space
is usually not well de￿ned. In either case, double investment reduces the risk
that there is no innovation at all since coordination on the equilibrium fails. It
doubles the chances that a fundamental, rather than only a marginal innova-
tion takes place. The fact that double investment does not yield zero pro￿ts
works like an insurance. Even if the competitor also succeeds, innovation in-
vestments are not futile. Of course, the Harberger ine¢ ciency persists, as do
the X-ine¢ ciencies that usually go along with cartels. But knowing about the
positive e⁄ect on innovation incentives, antitrust policy faces a harder choice
than is traditionally maintained.
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